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underlying business motives and, second, by the use of organisational beliefs and values systems to institutionalise the integrated 
strategic rationality throughout the firm. Finally, informed by the institutionalised strategic rationality, the participation and expertise of 
actors across the organisational hierarchy determines the level to which the design and execution of the eco-control technologies 
move beyond merely monitoring compliance, and act to facilitate continuous improvement, knowledge integration and organisational 
learning at the operational level.  
Originality: This paper responds to institutional theorists’ call for a holistic explanation that considers the 
interactions among several intra-organisational factors to explain the dynamics behind why some firms decouple 
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To the Letter versus the Spirit: 
A Case Analysis of Contrasting Environmental Management Responses 
 
Abstract: 
Purpose: This paper examines why firms governed by the same environmental management 
standards within an industry exhibit contrasting responses, with some adhering to the letter and 
others achieving the spirit behind the standards.  
Design: Using Arena et al. (2010) as an analytical schema to examine the institutional 
dynamics behind such contrasting responses, the paper analyses archival and interview data 
relating to firm strategy, control technology and human expertise in two contrasting Australian 
forestry firms.  
Findings: The embedding and decoupling of environmental standards with a firm’s 
environmental management practices is influenced, first, by the extent to which founder 
directors and senior management integrate environmental responsibility with the underlying 
business motives and, second, by the use of organisational beliefs and values systems to 
institutionalise the integrated strategic rationality throughout the firm. Finally, informed by the 
institutionalised strategic rationality, the participation and expertise of actors across the 
organisational hierarchy determines the level to which the design and execution of the eco-
control technologies move beyond merely monitoring compliance, and act to facilitate 
continuous improvement, knowledge integration and organisational learning at the operational 
level.  
Originality: This paper responds to institutional theorists’ call for a holistic explanation that 
considers the interactions among several intra-organisational factors to explain the dynamics 
behind why some firms decouple while others do not, even though the firms exist in the same 
social and regulatory context. 
Keywords: environmental strategy, environmental responsibility, environmental accounting, 
eco-controls, environmental management systems, environmental certification standards. 




Environmental impact is a critical governance issue for business organisations (Parker, 
2005; Pondeville et al., 2013). Numerous high profile environmental disasters have heightened 
global outcry and environmental activism, resulting in increased scrutiny over organisational 
accountability for their environmental footprint (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Norris and 
O'Dwyer, 2004; Rodrigue et al., 2013).  In response, environmental management standards 
such as the ISO 14001 (which are in addition to the regulatory restrictions imposed on a given 
industry) were developed as an initiative of ‘both governmental and other non-governmental 
actors to create patterns of voluntary environmental practices that can facilitate systematic 




objective of environmental standards is that the certification status that is accorded to firms 
offer a sense of pride and motivation for the firms to strive for proactive quality management 
through embedded policies and practice guidelines, which are globally comparable (Aragón-
Correa and Rubio-López, 2007; Contrafatto, 2014).  
However, empirical evidence (Murillo-Luna et al., 2011; Tenbrunsel et al., 2000; Yin 
and Schmeidler, 2009) exhibits mixed responses in relation to the role of the environmental 
management standards. Some studies (Esther, 2011; Masanet-Llodra, 2006; Melnyk et al., 
2003; Perez et al., 2007) find a positive association between environmental management 
standards and firms’ proactive response to environmental management. For instance, Bellesi 
et al. (2005) claim that the ISO 14001 environmental management standard offers a means for 
firms to positively distinguish themselves from competitors. In contrast, Boiral and Henri 
(2012) find no systematic relation between the ISO 14001 standard and firms’ proactive quality 
improvement. Further, Darnall and Sides (2008) find little relation between certification 
standards and the quality of environmental management. Boiral (2007) argues that gaining 
environmental certification may merely help legitimise firms’ current environmental practices, 
with little monitoring of their continued effectiveness. Similarly, Lannelongue and González -
Benito (2012) contend that certification is open to be used opportunistically by firms to manage 
public image rather than genuinely discharge their environmental responsibility.  
In summary, the extant literature suggests that though firms are subject to homogeneous 
conditions (i.e., same social and regulatory context), the design and execution of environmental 
management systems (EMS) among the firms is still heterogeneous, which result in contrasting 
outcomes. Why do firms respond differently when the extant homogeneous conditions demand 
uniformity in their social behaviour?  
Neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) offers 
some answers for this question.  It suggests that since firms operate within a society, they are 
subject to certain social structures of assumptions, including acceptable values and norms that 
exist within the society. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) further argue that such ‘institutionalised’ 
expectations pressure the firms to move toward adopting structures and policies that are similar 
to other firms in the society, a tendency called ‘isomorphism’. The logic is that isomorphism 
enables firms to gain legitimacy or social approval and increases their chances of long-run 
survival (Scott, 1995).  However, Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) argue that the firms’ efforts 
to move towards isomorphism are not free of adaptation problems. First, some social norms 
cannot be efficiently implemented in a firm without foregoing a few internal routines. For 
instance, Boiral (2007) finds that while the expectation in the implementation of the ISO 14001 
standards is wider employee acceptance of environmental responsibility, many firms actually 
experienced high pressure on record maintenance, which ultimately reduced the time available 
for routine product inspections. Second, a firm may be exposed to two conflicting institutional 
norms. Perez et al. (2007) find that the need to show a better environmental record meant that 
a firm had to decrease its output quantity or quality, at least in the short run. To resolve such 
problems, Meyer and Rowan (1977) theorise that firms tend to ‘decouple’ formal structures 
and policies from actual behaviours or practices. Scott (1995) clarifies that decoupling offers 
an efficient solution for firms facing problems in achieving isomorphism: it facilitates firms to 
pursue institutional requirements ‘ceremonially’, which is to adopt new structures without fully 
implementing the related practices. Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) list several organisational 
factors (such as internal support or leadership, public image, resource stringency and external 
stakeholder pressure) that determine why some firms decouple their structures from practices. 
In short, neo-institutional theory suggests that firms that are guided by one or more 




to rather adopt ‘ceremonial’ practices, which explain the presence of contrasting responses 
among different firms in any given society. 
In relation to environmental management, though neo-institutional theory has already 
been applied to explain the presence of contrasting organisational responses to EMS, the extant 
literature (e.g., Chan, 2008; Hillary, 2004; Murillo-Luna et al., 2011) merely identifies one or 
more overt organisational factors (e.g., financial constraints, lack of leadership or technical 
skills).  According to Greenwood et al. (2014), neo-institutional theory must move forward to 
examining the inter-connectedness among the overt factors within organisations in order to 
understand the dynamics of organisational heterogeneity.  This is consistent with Boxenbaum 
and Jonsson (2008, p.91) who also suggest that ‘attention should be devoted to investigating 
interactions among the already identified variables that seem to predict or mediate institutional 
decoupling’. In short, by examining interconnections among different organisational variables, 
this paper aims to explore the underlying dynamics of EMS heterogeneity among firms that are 
governed by the same context.  In turn, the paper also contributes to institutional theory by 
clarifying the interconnections among the organisational determinants of decoupling. 
 To carry out its aim, this paper undertakes a comparative case analysis of two large firms 
(in pseudonyms, Hardwood and Softwood) within the Australian forestry industry, subject to 
the same social and regulatory context. The forestry industry is seen as an appropriate setting 
for this study because efficient management of forestry firms have direct environmental impact, 
such as conservation of natural resources and reduction of soil erosion (Allday, 2011). Further, 
forestry industry is a major sector of the Australian economy, with over $2 billion exports and 
over $20 billion domestic sales and services, providing employment to over 70,500 Australians 
in 2013 (ABARES, 2014). Therefore, finding ways to foster EMS practices that are aligned 
with the spirit of the environmental management standards can lead to sustainable outcomes. 
Finally, this study also responds to calls for research on ‘environmental accountability in 
industry sectors beyond mining, chemicals and manufacturing’ (Parker, 2005, p.857).  
Data for this study are derived from semi-structured interviews of multiple governance 
stakeholders and from the archival information elicited from internal control documents (such 
as environmental policies, and procedure manuals) and externally-generated documentation 
(such as environmental certification audit reports and newspaper articles) of the two case firms. 
To capture interconnections among organisational factors in a structured way, which will form 
the foundation for building institutional theory-based explanations, we adopt Arena et al.’s 
(2010) analytical schema for collecting data about three inter-related organisational elements: 
experts, rationalities, and technologies. This schema helps examine the interconnections that 
exists among (i) espoused environmental strategic rationalities, (ii) stakeholder experts (e.g., 
environmental managers, auditors, project champions), and (iii) management control 
technologies that shape the firm’s environmental planning and decision-making. Consequently, 
we provide evidence on how people, structure and processes work to embed EMS 
implementation, which helps to explain why and how some firms decouple their organisational 
structures and practices in order to respond merely to the letter towards environmental 
standards while other firms continue to integrate their structures and practices so as to achieve 
the spirit behind the standards.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 delineates the conceptual foundations 
of the institutional factors on isomorphism and decoupling and thereafter relate the same to the 
environmental management literature. Section 3 describes the research method, such as the site 
selection criteria, data collection, sources of evidence, and background information of the two 




the links among strategic rationalisation, environmental experts and eco-controls in the two 
case study firms. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
While each firm can be seen to entail its own unique structure, culture and processes, 
there are also pressures for a firm to adopt homogeneous structures, particularly within a given 
context (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bird, 1993). The neo-institutional 
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) which gained popularity in the 
late 1970s as a conceptual lens for studying organisations as part of a complex social system 
proposes three major forces that lead to homogeneity in firm practices - coercive, mimetic and 
normative pressures. Coercive pressures on a firm arise with formal and informal forces exerted 
by the society upon which the firm is dependent. Manufacturers adopting new pollution control 
technologies to conform to the environmental regulations is an example of homogeneity under 
coercive pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Mimetic pressures refer to the motivation to 
imitate, which derives from uncertainty in the society. Ambiguous goals or lack of clarity in 
the design of systems can instigate firms to model themselves on the apparent winners (March 
and Olsen, 1976). Finally, normative pressures arise with firms’ need to subscribe to quality 
standards that are derived from the norms established by external professional bodies with 
which the firms’ employees may be affiliated (Mezias, 1990). The homogeneity in firms’ 
formal strategies, structures and procedures arise as a result of the need for firms to conform to 
institutional pressures not only for technical efficiency reasons, but also for increasing 
legitimacy through resource or survival capabilities (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  
However, while the apparent design of firm strategy and organisational procedures 
(modelled on a benchmark) of two firms may seem homogeneous, the underlying motivation 
between the two firms can vary, which lead to heterogeneity in their execution efforts (Hillary, 
2004; Lounsbury, 2008). That is, a firm may adopt the same policy as its competitor, but may 
still not enact or implement practices according to the intended purposes of the policy, thus 
leading to ‘decoupling’ of practice from the intended policy. Though decoupling is ingrained 
in the neo-institutional theory as a solution to overcome the difficulties in homogenisation, the 
extant research on the factors that drive decoupling has come under scrutiny (Fiss and Zajac, 
2006; Bromley and Powell, 2012). Since the theory (see Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008) 
identifies various overt factors (e.g., internal leadership, public image, resource stringency and 
external stakeholder pressure) at a macro level, without proceeding to examine how these 
factors interact dynamically within firms, Greenwood et al. (2014) contend that: 
“We have become overly concerned with explaining institutions and 
institutional processes, notably at the level of the organisation field,1 rather 
than using them to explain and understand organisations. Especially missing 
is an attempt to gain a coherent, holistic account of how organisations are 
structured and managed.” 
 
To address this limitation, Lounsbury (2008) and Pondeville et al. (2013) suggest that 
one must first be able to recognise the inter-connected demands of multiple stakeholders, which 
shape dynamic organisational practices. Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) assert that multiple 
demands arise with several assumptions, beliefs, and values, wherein some are specific to a 
1 The ‘organisation field’ refers to communities of organisations including industry associations, supplier groups, 




                                                 
given stakeholder group and some are common to many groups. Suddaby and Greenwood also 
argue that such assumptions, beliefs, and values are socially constructed and hence they shape 
individual decision-making and organisational behaviours according to the characteristics of a 
given context. The social construction within a firm occurs due to both external environmental 
factors (Selznick, 1957) as well as by intra-organisational groups (Cyert and March, 1963).  
Within the environmental management and accounting context, neo-institutional theory 
is deployed in examining the features of isomorphic structures that occur with community-
based pressures (e.g., Marquis et al., 2007; Ball and Craig, 2010) and how such isomorphic 
structures and decoupling enable diffusion of the principles of specific social movements (e.g., 
Lounsbury, 2001; Strang and Soule, 1998). In a similar vein, Marquis et al. (2011) review the 
research on isomorphic processes in organisations that are exposed to one or more specific 
concerns within geographically bounded, transnational and virtual communities.2 In summary, 
consistent with Greenwood et al. (2014), the use of neo-institutional theory within the 
environmental literature focuses on the ‘organisational-field’ level (as against the 
organisational level) observations and mainly capture the effects of specific group/community 
representations or activist programs (rather than the effects of interactions among multiple 
internal and external stakeholders of an organisation).   
Our paper contributes to this theoretical space: the use of neo-institutionalism at the 
organisational level within the environmental management context. Specifically, we focus on 
examining the dynamics underlying contrasting environmental responses between two similar 
firms, existing in the same society and falling under the same regulatory regime. To capture 
the underlying reasons behind the two contrasting responses, we adopt Arena et al. (2010), who 
offer an analytical schema based on three interrelated organisational components namely, 
rationalities, experts, and technologies.  
Arena et al.’s (2010) approach of rationalising an organisational problem or policy from 
a discursive field using both moral and economic justifications seems to fit our specific context 
of EMS, which is associated with both socio-cultural values and regulatory compliance. Since 
Arena et al. (2010) schema draws on a broad set of organisational variables, the power of the 
schema to inform neo-institutional theory is high.  In this regard, Contrafatto’s (2014, p. 418) 
argument that ‘cultural-cognitive elements (values, meanings and symbols) can be subjected 
to a process of institutionalisation in the same way as the normative-regulative pillars (routines 
and rules)’ lends additional support.  Moreover, since Arena et al. (2010, pp. 662-63) also apply 
the notion of decoupling to examine the heterogeneity in their context of enterprise risk 
management practices among different firms, we find that their schema is relevant to our study 
in examining firms’ diverse responses to the environmental standards. Specifically, it can 
provide insights into the interactions among various organisational factors that are likely to 
contribute to the decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) or embedding (Perez et al., 2007) of 
environmental standards into the operational practices of firms, which are subject to the same 
social context and regulatory regime.  
To fit our EMS context, we adapt Arena et al. (2010) to examine the interactions among 
(i) environmental strategic rationalities, (ii) stakeholder experts (e.g., environmental managers, 
auditors, project champions), and (iii) management control technologies. Environmental 
2 Though not anchored in neo-institutionalism, O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer (2009) is another key environmental 
management study that examines how community-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) use counter-
accounting approaches to dictate the scope of legitimacy of their financial institutions and guide the revision of 




                                                 
strategic rationalities help clarify why a particular environmental strategy is chosen, or has 
evolved, within a particular organisation and within a given period of time.3 Identification of 
environmental experts and champions follows the actors (Latour, 1987) and organisational 
roles involved in conceptualising and controlling environmental management activities (Arena 
et al., 2010). Environmental experts are the internal and external sense-makers (Basu and 
Palazzo, 2008) who hold specialised knowledge and understanding of the environmental risks 
and opportunities associated with operational activities. Champions act as key enablers of 
environmental projects, through their use of influence behaviour (such as inspirational appeals, 
consultation and rational persuasion) to gain organisational commitment (Gattiker and Carter, 
2010).  
Finally, as adapted from Arena et al. (2010, p.663), the definition of eco-control 
technologies for this study refers to ‘the complex set of practices, procedures and instruments 
put in place by organisations to carry out [environmental] strategies and plans’. The analysis 
will focus on the institutionalised beliefs (i.e., values, ideas, rules and regulations) promulgated 
by the formal, rationalised eco-control systems (Abernethy and Chua, 1996). In this respect, 
this study assesses the role of eco-controls as embedding mechanisms (Perez et al., 2007), and 
the extent to which eco-controls are used ‘to distribute shared meanings or mediate between 
diverse interests and interpretations’ of environmental management practices (Cuganesan et 
al., 2012, p.246). Included among the institutionalised beliefs and systems that allow for shared 
meanings are the environmental management standards. For instance, standards such as ISO 
14001 Environmental Management Systems (ISO, 2004) provide standardised language and 
common guidelines for practice, and as such may be able to facilitate shared meanings across 
organisational units, as well as set guidelines for minimum quality practices. 
 
3. Research Setting and Design 
3.1 Case analysis design 
Our research question seeks to examine why and how two firms that are subject to the 
same environmental management standards differ in their responses to environmental 
responsibility. The answers to this question must be sourced from multiple inter-connected 
perspectives. Such perspectives are likely to arise from primary in-depth observations from the 
field. A case study method is the preferred approach in such circumstances since it can offer a 
rich understanding of environmental management in practice based on their contextual setting 
- both in terms of the formal techniques, procedures and systems in place, and the way in which 
they are used by managers (Ryan et al., 2002). Guided by the recent research (Boiral, 2007; 
Masanet-Llodra, 2006; Perez et al., 2007; Rodrigue et al., 2013), a comparative case study 
approach is undertaken for this study, with data from two firms operating in the Australian 
forestry industry.  
3.2 Selection of the case study firms  
The choice of the two case study firms for this study were based on the following three 
reasons. First, this study examines concerns that can exist in an environmentally-sensitive 
3 The authors acknowledge that a parallel concept, institutional logics (comprising bundles of symbolic and 
material elements tied to different institutional orders), exists in the neo-institutional literature to clarify how firms 
obtain order and meaning to justify their existence. Multiple institutional orders create possibilities for internal 
conflicts and the outcome of those conflicts instigate social changes (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and 




                                                 
industry. The forestry industry faces higher environmental regulation by the government, as 
well as greater likelihood of significant scrutiny and pressure from external stakeholders to 
review and adopt effective environmental practices (Rodrigue et al., 2013; Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 1998). Second, the forestry industry is a key contributor to global sustainable 
development (Li and Toppinen, 2011) because they have a unique renewable resource base that 
allows individual firms to adopt advanced environmental management practices (Sharma and 
Henriques, 2005). Third, the selection of two firms from the same industry facilitate 
comparison through replication of results, either literally (when similar responses emerge) or 
theoretically (when contrary results emerge for predictable reasons) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sharma 
and Vredenburg, 1998). In judging and selecting appropriate case firms, the existence of 
Australian forest management certification is seen as critical.4 In Australia, forest certification 
is assessed against the relevant standard by an independent party or auditor.5 Further, forest 
managers and owners can seek certification under either the Australian Forest Certification 
Scheme (AFS),6 which is governed by the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC),7 or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).8 Both AFS and FSC are 
internationally recognised, not-for-profit forest certification bodies, which provide recognition 
for regional and national standards and the labelling of forest products as sustainably managed.  
3.3 Background information of case study firms 
Hardwood is a wholly-owned subsidiary of an Australian publicly-listed company, 
which provides plantation establishment and management services on behalf of both private 
and retail investors. Hardwood was established in 1990 and incorporated as a private firm in 
1995. It was first listed publicly in 2004 and thereafter underwent substantial ownership and 
management change during the period of 2006 to 2009. Hardwood employs more than 150 
employees in its central and regional offices, and manages over 170,000 hectares of pulp-grade 
hardwood and high-value timber plantations in different Australian states. At the time of 
inquiry, Hardwood held over $650 million in assets, including primary plantation assets, port 
infrastructure joint ventures and a shareholding in another listed forestry company. 
Softwood was established as a privately owned timber plantation company in 1998, 
prior to which it operated as a government-controlled entity. Softwood is jointly owned by 
Australian and US superannuation and infrastructure investment funds, and managed by an 
international forest management consortium based in North America. At the time of enquiry, 
Softwood had over $800 million in assets and 240,000 hectares of land under management - 
including 50,000 hectares of native vegetation for conservation. Softwood supplies logs for 
paper manufacturing, panel board and treated round-wood producers in Australia and overseas. 
While Softwood headquarters is based in Melbourne, the operations were divided among three 
geographical regions. Softwood employs around 135 full-time staff in its central and regional 
4 Forest management certification is a market-based, voluntary forest management tool designed to recognise and 
promote environmentally-responsible forestry and the sustainable management of forest resources. Prior studies 
select their case firms based on voluntary environmental management system standards such as EMAS and ISO 
14001 (with expectations for variances to still exist in the more specific environmental management practices 
across the sample firms) (Boiral, 2007; Masanet-Llodra, 2006; Perez et al., 2007). 
5 The AFS uses the Australian Forestry Standard [AS 4708] as the relevant standard for certifying forest 
management. The FSC currently uses interim, regionally-adapted forest management standards in Australia, and 







                                                 
offices, with the company’s harvesting, haulage and plantation contractors indirectly offering 
employment to a further 450 people.  
At the time of investigation, Hardwood and Softwood each held approximately a 5% 
market share. They also held environmental management credentials such as the FSC, AFS, 
and ISO 14001 certification. Both firms had operations within the state of Victoria, Australia 
and therefore faced similar state-level jurisdictional requirements. Neither firm produced 
periodic environmental or sustainability reporting. However Softwood had produced a number 
of brochures highlighting its environmental and social initiatives, such as restoration projects, 
conservation land holdings, native fauna monitoring, and fire management activities. 
External certification audit reports for a period of three years prior to the interview 
period were examined. The audit reports revealed both firms had incurred minor non-
compliance violations, which did not preclude their certification status but did require 
corrective action to be undertaken prior to the next annual audit. Likewise, the audit reports for 
both firms revealed that grievances had been lodged during the stakeholder consultation 
process. These grievances related to formal stakeholder communication processes, the impact 
of forestry activity on public roads and neighbouring land, and the conservation status of non-
commercial landholdings. Both firms stated that while they experience a ‘vocal minority’ of 
stakeholders who fundamentally opposed forestry activities, their overall engagement with 
local stakeholder groups was generally positive. From an external consumer or stakeholder 
perspective, the two firms are broadly comparable in terms of both their scale and operational 
activities, as well as their apparent commitment to environmental management. 
3.4 Data collection and sources of evidence 
Multiple sources of evidence were collected from each case firm. The sources of data 
for the study include (1) in-depth interviews with managers and environmental specialists from 
the two forestry firms; (2) corporate web-pages and company documents such as environmental 
policy documents, operational procedure manuals and brochures relating to stewardship 
projects; and (3) externally-generated documentation, such as environmental certification audit 
reports and newspaper articles. Letters outlining the study purpose and requesting participation 
were initially sent to environmental managers, and a snowball sampling technique (Atkinson 
and Flint, 2004) was thereon used to identify interviewees’ networks across different levels of 
the organisation hierarchy. A summary of the interview participants is provided in Table 1. 
------TABLE 1 HERE----- 
As noted in Table 1, the average number of years interview participants had been 
employed at Hardwood was lower than interviewees at Softwood. This difference may in part 
be explained by the ownership history between the two companies. While Softwood has largely 
operated under the same ownership and management structure since 1998, Hardwood was 
acquired by a conglomerate corporation with existing forestry assets in 2006, and subsequently 
underwent a period of significant restructure.9 This period of change was reflected in the fact 
that several of the interview participants at Hardwood had been transferred between regional 
offices during their employment. However, most of the interview participants at Hardwood 
9 With complex ownership changes (from small private to public listed firm, followed by major shareholding 
variations in Hardwood, and from a government-controlled to a large private-fund based ownership in Softwood), 
this study is unable to distil private versus public ownership as a potential determinant of decoupling.  Choosing 
firms that have always remained either public or private, future studies may seek to explore how ownership and 




                                                 
indicated that they had prior experience in the Forestry Industry. As result, they were also able 
to reflect on their experiences at Hardwood relative to other firms within the industry. 
The interviews were conducted over multiple site visits over six months. An interview 
guide was adopted to ensure consistency across interview participants, and interviews were 
conducted in a conversational style and recorded for ease of analysis. The process of coding 
and categorising data was conducted with the aid of the data analysis software, nVivo 9.0. The 
interview guide initially helped with categorising, grouping and comparing information based 
on emergent concepts and themes, and these were re-grouped to highlight concepts pertaining 
to the conceptual framework (i.e., strategic rationalities, environmental experts and champions, 
and eco-control technologies).  
 
4. Case Study Findings 
4.1 Business Environment Overview 
The forestry industry in Australia derives most of its revenue from managing native 
forests, plantations and timber tracts. The industry is governed by several regulations, most of 
which relate to sustainable management of forests. Further, each state government outlines a 
‘Code of Practice’ that sets out operating standards for planning, establishing, maintaining 
forests, and harvesting timber, along with the conservation of natural and cultural values of 
forests. In general, a firm’s strategic orientation towards environmental management is 
reflected in how the following three common operational processes are managed: 
i) Environmental impact monitoring, which concerns the management of short-term, 
direct environmental impacts of commercial operations (i.e., planting and harvesting). 
This includes managing soil disturbance and erosion, noxious weed control, use of 
agricultural chemicals and fertilisers, and preserving native vegetation and wildlife 
habitat;  
ii) Biodiversity monitoring, which relates to indirect and long-term impacts of operations 
on local ecosystems –including flora and fauna surveys, and waterways and catchment 
monitoring; and,  
iii) Stewardship project governance, which are voluntary initiatives such as rainforest and 
wetland rehabilitation projects and native species conservation programs, which extend 
beyond the day-to-day environmental impact of commercial forestry operations. These 
involve collaborating with stakeholders such as local communities, government bodies 
and NGOs to preserve and maintain environmental aspects of forestry landholdings. 
In the next section, case findings for each firm are provided in four distinct parts. The 
first part describes beliefs, values and meanings associated with environmental management 
that play an important role in shaping the pre-existing norms and practices within the firms, as 
well as the key governance stakeholders who interpret and apply environmental management 
standards. This is followed by a delineation of the differences observed within the common 
operational process at Hardwood and Softwood respectively, that is, environmental impact 
monitoring, biodiversity monitoring and stewardship project governance. 




4.2.1 Beliefs, Meanings and Governance Stakeholders 
Hardwood’s website and brochures prepared for external stakeholders, indicates that it 
tends to position itself as ‘Australia’s leader in certified hardwood forestry plantations’. 
However, there is limited information on the values, purpose and direction of the firm. A one-
page ‘Sustainable Forest Management’ policy is available on the corporate website as required 
by external certification standards, though the rationale for environmental management 
activities is not defined or communicated to operational staff: 
“At an organisation-wide level there are no goals, no mission statement that 
relates to it, or anything like that.” (Hardwood Harvest Planning Manager). 
The thrust to attain environmental management certification at Hardwood occurred 
whilst it still operated as a privately owned firm, first with ISO 14001 in 2000 followed by FSC 
in 2004. Evidence suggests that the founding owner’s perceived need for external legitimacy 
and enhanced corporate image were the key drivers in Hardwood’s pursuit of certification. As 
noted by the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) co-ordinator: 
 “The guy that owned the company back then, I think was the main driver - 
wanted to be seen as an environmentally-conscious company…I think it was 
more about image.” (Hardwood HSE Co-ordinator). 
However, during subsequent ownership changes the rationale for environmental 
management activities has shifted towards a more compliance oriented stance, with greater 
focus on commercial outcomes. The need to maintain FSC certification is seen as being 
‘customer driven’, since such symbols are deemed necessary to retain market share in the face 
of increasing competition from both domestic and international market players: 
“FSC is seen as very important by our customers, or at least they tell us it is. 
They don’t necessarily pay us anything more for certified wood. So, as a 
company, there’s a strong, I guess, goal to maintain our FSC certification” 
(Hardwood Harvest Planning Manager). 
The compliance rationale, coupled with a commercially oriented resource stringency, 
at Hardwood is exemplified by the lack of resource commitment and budgeting for 
environmental management activities. Beyond the direct costs of maintaining certification such 
as auditing costs, licensing fees, and memberships, the allocation of funding for environmental 
expenditure is typically limited:  
“Unfortunately, and I’ll be frank, we don’t have a budget. It’s crazy, there is 
no official environmental budget. It’s quite ridiculous. So I’ve got to manage 
environmental programs out of my operational budget” (Hardwood Regional 
Manager).  
As noted by the HSE Co-ordinator at Hardwood, the success of environmental 
management initiatives has, accordingly, hinged on regional managers’ ability to leverage them 
into the operational staff’s existing workloads:  
“It’s trying to sort of absorb it in indirect costs rather than direct costs. In 
people’s time … It’s just been absorbed into everyday running costs. It’s not 
factored as a separate item, except for my direct certification costs” 




The environmental experts at Hardwood are identified from the regional level (with no 
dedicated positions at senior executive levels) to oversee environmental management activities. 
Key environmental staff report to regional managers who, in turn, report to the General 
Manager for Forestry - whose responsibilities encompass all aspects of forestry operations. 
Further, individuals assigned with environmental management responsibilities, typically, 
occupy either part-time positions (i.e., HSE Co-ordinator) or ‘officer’ roles in addition to their 
primary duties. Evidence suggests that environmental officers were often not fully informed of 
the nature or extent of their responsibilities: 
“I don’t know if I’ve ever actually seen a brief for what the environmental 
officer actually does…The environmental officer [title] is something that I’ve 
sort of inherited since taking up this role. And yeah, something I do as an 
aside, very much an aside to my principal role.” (Hardwood Environmental 
Officer). 
Hardwood operates a committee to manage the ‘day-to-day running’ of the company’s 
EMS. The committee consists of a representative from each region, along with the HSE and 
biodiversity co-ordinators, and is responsible for the development of environmental policies 
and operational procedures. While operational staff are provided opportunity to provide input 
into the developmental process during formal meetings, this input is typically limited to a 
ceremonial ‘tick-and-flick’ through the document. In additional to internal governance 
stakeholders, evidence suggests that formal external audit processes assessing compliance with 
regulatory and certification standards play a critical role in surfacing EMS issues in relation to 
conformance: 
“So the audit will identify some areas of concern or some non-conformances 
that are discussed between the auditor and the manager. We develop a set of 
actions that they need to implement to address the issues, and then that’s all 
logged in their action-register and tracked through that process.” (Hardwood 
HSE Co-ordinator). 
A field-level manager also provided a similar view:  
“You know, we’d get a corrective action in an audit and [then] change that bit 
of the system.” (Hardwood Harvest Planning Manager). 
4.2.2  Environmental Impact Monitoring Systems 
The direct environmental impact of Hardwood’s forestry operations is overseen by four 
regional managers, covering forestry landholdings in 13 districts in five Australian states. In 
order to manage the environmental aspects of its operations, Hardwood maintains an on-line 
EMS, made accessible to staff via a company intranet. This central database is used to 
communicate organisation-wide environmental management policies, facilitate data 
management and record keeping, as well as to outline operational procedures in line with the 
ISO 14001 standards.  
Hardwood’s management of the direct environmental impact of their commercial 
operations is undertaken at the regional site offices. Specifically, formalised Forest 
Management Plans are developed at the individual property level and are used to map out 
detailed environmental traits of each estate in order to identify: non-commercial land including 
remnant vegetation, areas of rare flora and fauna, and exclusion zones such as wetlands and 
waterways. Within the scope of the local Forest Management Plans, ‘Standard Operating 




commencement of a new work request. The operating procedure manuals provide detailed 
specifications and ‘minimum environmental standards’ to be maintained for a specific task. 
Regulatory guidelines determine what staff at Hardwood need to do: 
“Basically, the level that we’re expected to do our work on an environmental 
sense is legislated – which is exactly the way you would expect it to be … In 
terms of what we are trying to achieve on the ground, our environmental on 
ground stuff is basically dictated by legislation - which is fine.” (Hardwood 
Environmental Officer). 
However, inconsistencies within environmental standards and continual amendments 
resulting from compliance audits have impeded the efficacy of Hardwood’s EMS. As noted by 
the Hardwood HSE Co-ordinator: 
“It was just a simple environmental management system… Then we get a 
forest management certification, and we’ve got to change all this – OK. Then 
we get another one. You know, it keeps evolving, and it becomes ad hoc and 
it has lost its systematic process.” (Hardwood HSE Co-ordinator). 
Thus, the design limitations of Hardwood’s EMS and, in particular, the lack of clarity 
surrounding the operational staff’s environmental management responsibilities appears to give 
rise to confusion and uncertainty on what is best practice or even acceptable practice: 
“I’ve struggled with the [EMS] a little bit. But I’ve learnt that it’s just been 
built on, and built on, and built on, and people have moved on. It does tend to 
get confusing the more I am getting into it, the processes of it and who sort of 
runs what.” (Hardwood District Forester B). 
“I find the current system a little bit piecemeal, and trying to get a strategic 
picture out of it is very hard, because it is all over the shop, in my mind 
anyway.” (Hardwood Environmental Officer). 
In addition, formal evaluation of Hardwood’s environmental performance beyond 
reporting environmental incidents and periodic auditing by regulatory and certification bodies 
is limited. The following responses to the question, ‘How is environmental performance 
evaluated?’ attest to this: 
“I don’t actually know. There are no real benchmarks - no measurement of 
our environmental performance.” (Hardwood Harvest Planning Manager) 
“Evaluated? Yeah, it’s done by the auditors, basically. There’s not a big push 
from up top unless things are going the wrong way.” (Hardwood Regional 
Manager) 
4.2.3 Biodiversity Monitoring Systems 
At Hardwood there is a general level of uncertainty regarding longer term plans on how 
to monitor and manage biodiversity impacts, and who is responsible for initiating and 
monitoring the programs (including what the data produced in this process is actually used for): 
“I suppose it’s more the environmental officer [who] deals with a lot of that 




“I’ve had really brief chats with [the biodiversity officer] about that…it has 
been down on my list of priorities in terms of what I’ve been doing.” 
(Environmental Officer). 
“I think you are asking ‘do you present your results in an open forum?’ We 
don’t do that. Maybe we should [laughs]. I’m just trying to think how we use 
that information.” (Hardwood Regional Manager). 
Evidence suggests that interviewees were often unsure of the underlying rationale for 
such activities. In general, the need to comply with certification and other industry regulation 
is referred to as the ‘possible’ rationale for bio-diversity initiatives. Thus, our inquiry into the 
management of biodiversity monitoring programs suggests that many environmental 
management activities at Hardwood are largely symbolic in nature, primarily undertaken to 
satisfy the requirements of an external standard (cf. Boiral, 2007). This is also evident in their 
failure to produce either internal or external reporting of the monitoring outcomes, or connect 
data collection processes with formalised performance management techniques.  
“We measure it for the certification, to show that we are doing things to keep 
our accreditation.” (Hardwood Regional Manager) 
4.2.4 Stewardship Projects  
Ongoing stewardship projects at Hardwood include programs to eradicate noxious 
weeds, and fencing off remnant vegetation of high value to exclude livestock grazing. At the 
time of interview, Hardwood was not involved in any significant rehabilitation or conservation 
projects, though in the past had undertaken wetland revegetation and bird monitoring joint-
programs with various state government departments. While these projects were perceived as 
successful and as contributing to certification against the FSC standard, there is lack of ongoing 
support for new projects. In most cases, stewardship projects are restricted to non-commercial 
land and rely on collaborating with external environmental groups, ‘depending on who’s got 
funding’ (Hardwood Regional Manager). 
The identification of new projects tends to be driven by motivated individuals at the 
regional level. For example, the experiences of ‘Jack’, a former employee who championed 
this area, are frequently drawn on by other interviewees: 
“[Jack] did some great environmental works in the region, and he just did that 
off his own back really. He wasn’t told to do it, and he went and secured all 
the funding. You know, he did it because he had a passion for doing it, not 
because there was any incentive or because he would get a bonus.” (Hardwood 
HSE Co-ordinator) 
Evidence suggests that this lack of recognition and financial support from senior management 
have implications for employee morale since the otherwise committed employees are less 
likely to search for and champion new opportunities, resulting in potential environmental 
projects remaining unrealised. 
4.3 Softwood Case Findings 
4.3.1 Beliefs, Meanings and Governance Stakeholders  
Softwood is the first forestry company in Australia to receive FSC certification in 2004, 




AFS standard in 2007. Softwood emphasises Forest Stewardship which is reflected in their 
company’s mission statement:10 
Mission: ‘To deliver optimal value to our investors in a way that embraces and 
demonstrates Forest Stewardship by continuous development of skills and 
practices so that we are widely respected as responsible business and 
environmental managers.’ 
The mission statement is visible in many of the documents distributed to staff through 
the company intranet and training programs, and reiterated through the use of a visual analogy 
depicting the three foundations of organisational performance: 
“Stewardship is where, if you like, you’ve got three legs on the stool – one of 
them is commercial, one of them is environmental, one of them is community 
relations or the social aspects. And you need to pay attention to those three 
areas in an equal way so that those three legs are equal, and therefore stable.” 
(Softwood EMS Manager) 
Softwood adopts a ‘people-planet-profit’ nexus that can be traced to the organisational 
culture promoted by the international forest management consortium who took over the 
plantations and privatised the entity in 1998: 
“They [the managers of Softwood] have a very strong ethic around 
stewardship and good forest management. … When they walked in the door, 
they said, ‘This is how we’re going to run this’. ‘Good stewardship is good 
business’ is their sort of motto.” (Softwood GM, Stewardship & Risk) 
Further, forest management certification is seen as an outcome of good forestry management 
rather than as the core justification for EMS implementation: 
“I don’t like to think of us managing our forest so that we can have AFS or 
FSC certification. The way I see it is that we manage our forest well, and we 
bring these people in to have a look at it and say ‘yeah, that’s well enough to 
meet our standard, so we’ll give you a tick for that’.” (Softwood GM, 
Stewardship & Risk) 
Softwood has a General Manager (GM) for Stewardship and Risk to oversee all aspects 
of the company’s environmental management activities, and the GM is supported by the EMS 
Manager to facilitate communication and implementation of consistent policies and procedures 
across each of the regions. At the operational level, Stewardship Foresters are engaged in each 
region and responsible for environmental monitoring activities, operational auditing, and 
overseeing the company’s stewardship projects. Further, the identification of environmental 
expertise within the company extends beyond specialist staff positions, with recognition given 
to the cumulative knowledge and expertise of the broader workforce:  
10 Source: internal document distributed via Softwood’s intranet, titled: ‘Forest Stewardship – A Foundation 
for Best Management Practices’. ‘Forest Stewardship is establishing, harvesting and protecting our clients’ 







                                                 
“Most things are done by consensus and by involving enough people to ensure 
that all views are taken on board.” (Softwood Regional Planning Manager) 
Formal audit processes gather a broader meaning at Softwood, with independent 
auditors voluntarily engaged to assess compliance with regulatory and certification standards 
also encouraged by senior management to take on performance assessments to identify 
potential opportunities for further improvements in operations and performance:  
“We do third-party external audits of our operations. And so those auditors 
would give us advice, firstly, on whether they think we are meeting the Code, 
and secondly on meeting our own internal standards, or in fact whether we 
could improve the standard.” (Softwood GM for Stewardship and Risk) 
In this respect, auditors’ role in shaping the environmental strategic rationality and the sense-
making of forestry certification at Softwood revolve around value-enhancement and process 
sustainability. 
4.3.2 Environmental Impact Monitoring Systems 
The management of Softwood’s operational activities is divided into three distinct 
geographic regions of south-eastern Australia, with staff operating from six district offices. 
Similar to Hardwood, an on-line EMS is also available at Softwood via a company intranet to 
support EMS activities. However, the central database is structured around Softwood’s overall 
Forest Stewardship Policy, which lists ten principles for managing the environmental aspects 
under the company’s control. The EMS is integrated into Softwood’s overall business 
management and incorporates ‘organisational structure, planning activities, responsibilities, 
practices, procedures, processes and resources for developing, reviewing and maintaining the 
stewardship objectives as laid down in the company Forest Stewardship Policy’ (Softwood 
Internal Corporate Document). 
Similar to Hardwood, Softwood also relies on operational controls, in the form of site-
specific management plans, to manage the environmental aspects of operational activities. 
However, following a site-specific environmental risk assessment, company-wide operating 
procedures, termed ‘Best Management Practices’ (BMPs), are used to communicate desired 
performance standards to contractors, as well providing detailed specifications for how a given 
task should be performed. These standards form the basis for evaluating Softwood’s 
performance against the organisation’s commercial, environmental and community relations 
goals, which are established for each operational activity. 
The process of environmental performance benchmarking at Softwood includes the 
identification of short- and long-term objectives which typically exceed minimum regulatory 
requirements, reflecting long-term environmental responsibility (Hunt and Auster, 1990; 
Roome, 1992): 
“We operate within a comprehensive legal framework for management of 
environmental aspects of our forest management activities, and we go beyond 
the legal benchmark to maintain our reputation as good corporate citizens and 
to maintain our social licence to operate.” (Softwood EMS Manager) 
At Softwood, the transparent nature of operational controls provides users with both a 
localised perspective of environmental responsibilities, and an understanding of how their local 




is achieved by ensuring that operational staff are involved in the development of new policies 
and procedures (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008): 
“We would put the document together, but we would do it with the assistance 
of all of our people in the field because, firstly, they’re the experts, and 
secondly there’s no point coming up with what we think is best practice if all 
those guys are saying ‘well that sounds fine in the office, but when I get out 
in the field it’s not practical’. So we use their advice to put [procedures] 
together.” (Softwood GM, Stewardship & Risk) 
Further BMPs are viewed as ‘dynamic documents’, with staff continuously revising 
them as part of a formalised ‘core continuous improvement process’. This process involves 
responding to incidents, and anticipation and scoping of potential issues via formalised 
knowledge-sharing mechanisms and group meetings, both at regional and company levels. 
Although this continuous improvement process is internally driven, Softwood also engages in 
regular dialogue with other stakeholders such as community organisations, councils and NGOs. 
4.3.3 Biodiversity Monitoring  
At Softwood, a key assumption held is to manage the ‘biodiversity values’ associated 
with the forests as ‘custodians’, on behalf of both their investors and the broader community, 
to safeguard the ‘cultural heritage’ and indigenous significance associated with the land.  
“The company manages 50,000 hectares of native forest for conservation 
purposes - so the biodiversity within that native forests estate is quite large. 
It’s an extremely important asset, both for the company and for the 
community, so we feel that monitoring that is quite important.” (Softwood 
Stewardship Forester) 
Biodiversity programmes at Softwood span three regional areas, and aim to maintain 
the biodiversity value associated with their forestry landholdings. The programmes include a 
series of fauna surveys, which include a significant vegetation mapping project to identify the 
dominant species and age structure across Softwood’s entire estate, as well as monitoring both 
baseline water quality and macro-invertebrate populations in waterways within their properties. 
The stewardship foresters in each region play a key role in the design and oversight of the 
programmes including identifying the stakeholders responsible for the collation and analysis 
of data from the monitoring activities. 
4.3.4 Stewardship Projects 
Softwood’s past and present involvement in numerous stewardship projects is 
highlighted during the interviews. Examples of these projects included participating in research 
and conservation programs for threatened native species, such as Koalas, the rehabilitation of 
a tract of cool-temperate rainforest, and the establishment of native wildlife corridors on 
company land. The identification of stewardship programs at Softwood is driven by project 
champions originating from middle management and operational staff. Senior management at 
Softwood were also willing to commit funding and resources for such projects, in particular, 
where mutual benefits for both the company and the wider community can be identified: 
“We’re not a philanthropic organisation. We’re not a bottomless pit. But we 
are conscious of the fact that we manage a lot of waterways and other features 




The performance and impact-conscious culture of Softwood is reflected in the 
stewardship programmes. There is also an awareness of the costs associated with such projects, 
and, in fact, new stewardship projects are generally assessed using cost-benefit type analysis 
methods. Nevertheless, Softwood views ‘costs’ in a wider perspective. As noted by Softwood’s 
EMS Manager, the costs of restoration projects, for instance, are largely non-financial, and can 
be limited to the sacrifice of small, unprofitable areas of forestry holdings, as well as providing 
knowledge, skills and management expertise of its forestry employees. At the same time, the 
perceived ‘benefits’ of Softwood’s involvement in such projects include the potential for 
enhancing its reputation in the local community, enabling ‘ease of operation’ with community 
support, less resistance to their business operations, and general improvements in employee 
morale and satisfaction.  
As noted by one senior manager: 
“Those sorts of projects provide you with a bit of additional social licence to 
do business, because you’ve actually got neighbours and so on who are 
looking at you and thinking you are, in fact, a genuine steward of the land, and 
that you take your responsibility seriously. So we do it for those reasons. We 
do it for the reason [that] our staff like to do them ... I guess it’s a nice addition 
for our staff to know that these things are going on in their business. It gives 
them some pride in their business.” (Softwood GM, Stewardship & Risk) 
 
5. Discussion 
In this section, the case observations are analysed with the aid of Arena et al.’s (2010) 
analytical schema, to examine the interconnections among organisational factors surrounding 
EMS that lead to divergent firm responses and build an institutional theory-based explanation 
for such heterogeneity. While similarities in the EMS exist between the two firms (i.e., both 
adhere to regulatory standards as specified by forestry Code of Practice, maintain certification 
to internationally-recognised forest management standards, utilise on-line management 
systems and adopt basic eco-controls, namely forest management plans and operational 
procedures), Softwood appears to take a more voluntary, proactive approach to environmental 
management standards when compared to Hardwood which adopts a commercially-focused, 
compliance orientation coupled with resource stringency. In terms of theory, the contrasting 
interpretations of certification standards can be thought of as ranging from embeddedness 
(Perez et al., 2007) to decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), corresponding to the varying 
degrees of assimilation of environmental concerns into firms’ practices. The following sub-
sections discuss how the interactions among the three dimensions of environmental strategic 
rationalities, environmental experts and champions, and eco-control technologies has led to the 
firms’ divergent responses to the environmental standards within the forestry context. The key 
findings are summarised in Table 2. 
------TABLE 2 HERE----- 
5.1 Environmental Strategic Rationalities 
A core recurring theme raised by managers in their interviews was the highly-regulated 
nature of the forestry industry in Australia and the growing scrutiny over the integrity of the 
forestry supply chain. Further, firms are also confronted with increasing pressures from global 




However, while both firms recognise the importance to conform to established certification 
standards for EMS, the responses of the two firms contrast with each other. 
Similar to Arena et al. (2010), we observe that EMS practices are ‘indelibly marked’ 
by the strategic rationality evoked on inception. This is most apparent in the case of Softwood, 
where the overriding influence of the international forest management consortium and 
founding directors entrenched the ‘Forest Stewardship’ ideology within the lexicon of the firm. 
Forest Stewardship evolved and integrated with business strategy and, in turn, led to the equal 
consideration of the commercial, environmental and community relations impacts, as the basis 
of subsequent decision making surrounding operational activities. The necessity to be ‘widely 
respected as responsible business and environmental managers’ was inscribed in the company’s 
mission statement, and reinforced in official documents and presentations. The result is that, 
for Softwood, forest management certification is perceived to be an outcome, not a driver, of 
good Forest Stewardship. 
In addition, the central guiding principle of Forest Stewardship, rooted in the 
management leadership style at Softwood, viewed environmental responsibility as an 
investment, which in turn allowed the firm to view environmental management from a benefit 
perspective (i.e., long run returns or economic viability). This resulted in greater appetite for 
voluntary commitment of resources to environmental sustainability. This is reflected in 
Softwood’s proactive investment in environmental management initiatives beyond the direct 
impact of operations (e.g., bio-diversity enhancement and forestry stewardship projects) with 
a view to gain financial as well as non-financial outcomes (e.g., environmental upgrades and 
community benefits).  
At Hardwood, the presence of the influential founding director, who first established 
environmental management and certification programs, ceased when the firm was publicly 
listed and subsequently acquired by a conglomerate corporation. Further, the lack of formalised 
systems to promote shared responsibility for environmental objectives meant that the original 
rationale for environmental management initiatives was lost during the ensuing management 
restructure and operational staff turnover. As result, the environmental and business strategies 
evolved independently, with their own individual objectives of regulatory conformance and 
economic profitability.  
Furthermore, we observe that environmental management at Hardwood appears to be 
driven by two competing rationalities: the need to comply with environmental standards 
outlined in the regulatory requirements, and maintaining ‘market-driven’ forest management 
certification. Environmental management is therefore viewed only from a cost rather than a 
long-term benefit perspective, with greater focus on commercial outcomes. That is, the 
implementation of environmental management is viewed as an unavoidable fixed cost and 
hence environmental management initiatives are largely constrained to ensuring operational 
activities comply with standards outlined in the forestry Code of Practice. In addition, there 
was a pervasive belief among field operational managers that forest management certifications 
are ‘customer-driven’, and therefore necessary to retain market share in the face of increasing 
competition. It is evident that many environmental management activities and processes at 
Hardwood are administrative in nature, and data are collected and records kept as evidence for 
certification, with scant availability of resources for environmental management initiatives 
such as bio-diversity monitoring or stewardship projects that were voluntary and long-term in 
nature.  




Similar to the Arena et al. (2010), we find that the scope of environmental responsibility 
as perceived by the managers are also shaped by the views and involvement of internal and 
external stakeholders who take on the role of environmental experts and champions.  
The importance of senior management’s empathy towards environmental sustainability 
in uplifting EMS quality is illustrated in the case of Softwood, where experts on environmental 
matters are not only identified at the senior executive level, but also throughout the firm. 
Softwood’s General Manager for Stewardship and Risk works closely with a team of 
stewardship foresters, the external relations manager and the regional area managers. The 
identification of environmental experts and champions across multiple levels of the 
organisational hierarchy reflects the broad level of acceptance and ownership of environmental 
responsibility at Softwood.  
Prior studies similarly report that the more comprehensive and socially-complex nature 
of a more proactive environmental strategy necessitates significant employee involvement and 
work unit co-ordination – from the board room to the on-the ground field work areas (Hunt and 
Auster, 1990; Russo and Fouts, 1997). This stance is also illustrated by the participative 
processes (Adler and Borys, 1996; Wouters and Wilderom, 2008) observed within Softwood, 
with foresters, field managers and senior environmental managers involved in developing new 
environmental policies and procedures. Further, by facilitating knowledge integration at the 
operational level (Ditillo, 2004), participative development processes foster employee 
commitment and contribute to organisational learning about effective ways of managing 
operations (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008). 
 “One of the reasons for having an EMS is to trap company knowledge, IP, 
experience, so that as staff change over knowledge is not lost, and risks are 
reduced due to [having] a system which enables knowledge to be passed on to 
new staff.” (Softwood GM, Stewardship & Risk)  
Participative development processes at Softwood further contribute to the transparent 
nature of operational controls, which provide users with both a localised perspective of EMS, 
and a clearer understanding of how their local tasks fitted into the organisation as a whole 
(Adler and Borys, 1996). This transparency allows for discussion and debate of management 
plans between operational level staff and contractors, and allows front-line users to identify 
emerging environmental threats and prevent environmental incidents before they occur. 
In the case of Hardwood, where maintaining certification and compliance are important 
factors, the roles and voices of experts that facilitate gaining legitimacy such as environmental 
auditors become critical. Employees’ learning of what works and does not work revolve around 
external auditors’ findings and reports, and incidences of non-compliance became the triggers 
to judge if the firm was meeting its environmental responsibility. Further, the communication 
regarding the rationale for the choice of corrective actions in the field between managerial 
levels was hierarchical and administrative in tone, which in turn restricted developing a more 
wholesome understanding of firm strategy. The uncertainty and lack of clarity surrounding 
environmental management activities may further be attributed to the failure of senior 
management to communicate the purpose and rationale of such activities. This lack of 
leadership from senior management, coupled with the constraining nature of boundary rules 
and feedback systems, has narrowed environmental responsibility and in turn have impeded 
Hardwood from embedding environmental concerns into operational activities.  
In contrast, at Softwood there is a stronger sense of shared environmental responsibility 




values and beliefs of employees (Falkenberg and Herremans, 1995; Norris and O'Dwyer, 
2004). Employees’ social identification with the company’s environmentally-responsive goals 
(Adler and Chen, 2011) is supported by organic communication processes, characterised by 
free flows of information across the company (Chenhall and Morris, 1995). The informal and 
social control processes are complemented by a formal beliefs system, promoting a shared 
environmental vision throughout the firm (Arjaliès and Mundy, 2013; Rodrigue et al., 2013). 
5.3 Eco-control Technologies  
We observe notable differences in the discursive framing and application of eco-control 
technologies among the two case firms, which illustrate how the dynamics between rationalities 
and experts contribute to either embedding or decoupling of environmental management 
standards into operational practices. 
Both firms adopt similar eco-control technologies, including the utilisation of on-line 
management systems as well as forest management plans and operational procedures, to plan, 
control and monitor the environmental impact of operational activities. When describing 
formal policies and procedures, Softwood terms operational controls ‘Best Management 
Practices’, which are viewed as ‘dynamic documents’, and subject to continuous improvement 
through participative development process and consultation with relevant external 
stakeholders. Enabled by its pervasive Forest Stewardship rationale, Softwood takes a broader 
approach to the conceptualisation of performance, and have embedded economic, 
environmental and social performance standards into each of is operational procedures. The 
procedures are communicated to staff via a central database, which is systematically mapped 
against Softwood’s overall Forest Stewardship Policy. Performance against the standards is 
then assessed via a comprehensive audit program, with separate audits conducted by internal 
stewardship foresters, two forest management certification bodies, as well as an independent 
third-party auditor. This is consistent with an advanced level of embeddedness, as described 
by Perez et al. (2007), which encompasses cross functional coordination and commitment of 
employees, and a more advanced use of eco-control technologies, driven by the overall 
influence of powerful and committed actors who care strongly about implementation (Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004). 
In Hardwood, the discourse surrounding formal policies and procedures is more 
consistent with the apparent conformance rationality, with greater focus on regulatory 
requirements. ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ are used to prescribe the ‘minimum 
environmental standards’ to be maintained for a specific task, with performance levels typically 
limited to operating standards outlined in the forestry Code of Practice. In this respect, 
operational controls are designed to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements, with 
forest management certification schemes seen as an add-on, and maintained due to a 
commercial imperative to retain market share. 
We find that Hardwood has struggled to grapple with the challenge of integrating the 
competing environmental management standards into a single, coherent management system. 
The conformance rationalisations at Hardwood tend to reduce managers’ focus to the minimum 
standards and criteria set by regulatory and certification standards. As result, the use of eco-
control information is primarily restricted to responding to incidents or audit non-compliance, 
which in turn contributes to ad-hoc amendment and development processes, as opposed to the 
systematic and inclusive processes observed at Softwood. This has in turn impeded the ability 
of Hardwood’s operational staff to understand their roles within the firm, and how their 




posed by the two competing rationalities, and in particular the extent to which certification 
standards exceed the forestry Code of Practice, certification requirements have largely been 
decoupled from operational practices. The result is that operational procedures continue to 
uphold regulatory requirements, but certification programs have become ceremonial in nature, 
with largely administrative routines adopted to demonstrate compliance against standards. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Dwindling forestry stock around the world makes effective and efficient environmental 
management a critical function. Environmental standards are a way to facilitate organisations 
to engage in proactive involvement in environmental management (Aragón-Correa and Rubio-
López, 2007,). However, the empirical reality is that firms exhibit diverse responses to the 
standards with some following it to the letter with others to the spirit, even though the firms 
exist within a homogeneous context. 
 While the extant literature (Chan, 2008; Hillary, 2004; Murillo-Luna et al., 2011) 
identifies a few overt factors, Greenwood et al. (2014) contend that there is no holistic 
articulation of how different factors are interconnected within organisations to offer a rich 
understanding of the heterogeneity in firms that are governed by a homogeneous context.  
Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) argue that understanding the interconnections among overt 
factors can provide a better perspective on the determinants of decoupling.   
This study addresses this gap in knowledge by examining the organisational dynamics 
that shape and influence why firms, existing in the same society and falling under the same 
regulatory regime firms, differ in their approach to environmental management standards. 
Adopting the approach of Arena et al. (2010), and based on evidence from two Australian 
forestry firms, we offer insights on how the interactions among environmental rationalities and 
the role of environmental experts trigger different ways eco-controls are developed and utilised.  
Our findings suggest that both embedding and decoupling of environmental standards 
with a firm’s environmental management practices is influenced by both extant senior 
managers and founder directors whose views are also shaped and endorsed by audit 
professionals and domain experts. This is consistent with the findings of Fiss and Zajac (2004), 
who observe that decoupling is less likely in firms where powerful and committed actors are 
involved in the implementation and could influence organisational response. However, our 
findings extend beyond the actors’ power and commitment to emphasise the roles of 
rationalities and technologies. The strategic intent legitimised by these key agents are seen to 
spawn certain institutional rationalities, which in turn determine the nature and extent of 
environmental strategic planning, management control and information technologies. The 
dynamics between the rationalities and the agents are seen not only to affect the technologies 
but are also seen to be affected by such technologies. In short, we find that technologies also 
contribute to shaping new emerging rationalities, which in turn, enable the key agents to review 
the embedding or decoupling decisions between certification standards and environmental 
management practices.  
In Softwood, the ‘Forest Stewardship’ rationality that underpinned the business motives 
of the founding directors informed the ‘socially constructed beliefs and values’ (Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005) of the firm, and led to the integration of commercial, environmental and 
community relations objectives into operational activities. This, in turn, led to environmental 




environmental management from a benefit perspective (i.e., long run returns or economic 
viability). Further, apart from the role of monitoring compliance, the audit function was 
enhanced to recommending improvements to the firm’s strategic initiatives, which was 
instrumental in improving the quality of its eco-control technology. The result is that, for 
Softwood, forest management certification was perceived to be an outcome, and not a driver, 
of good Forest Stewardship. 
Conversely, the EMS practices at Hardwood seemed to be driven by two competing 
rationalities: the need to comply with minimum environmental standards outlined in regulatory 
requirements, and maintaining ‘market-driven’ forest management certification. This lack of 
synchronisation was evident in Hardwood’s efforts to comply with environmental standards 
outlined in regulatory requirements, with largely ceremonial and administrative routines 
adopted to maintain ‘market-driven’ forest management certification. From this perspective, 
certification became viewed as an unavoidable necessity, which in turn offers better public 
image, customer response, business legitimacy and firm survival. The result is that while 
operational procedures were primarily used to maintain compliance with regulatory 
requirements, certification programs became decoupled from operational practices, with 
largely administrative routines adopted to demonstrate compliance against standards (cf. 
Boiral, 2007; Lannelongue and González -Benito, 2012). 
In relation to this study’s research question of why firms provide contrasting responses 
in relation to environmental standards, this study finds solutions in the nature of interactions 
among organisational actors, strategic rationalities and eco-control technologies.  While prior 
studies (e.g., Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Boiral, 2007; Perez et al., 2007) find that the absence of 
powerful and committed actors is a determinant of decoupling organisational response to 
environmental standards, our study extends their findings to provide evidence of how the 
influence of internal leadership contributes to the embedding or decoupling of environmental 
management standards into operational practices. 
In the first instance, the influence of environmental leadership from the founding 
directors or senior management determines the level to which a firm’s environmental vision is 
integrated or synchronised with the underlying business motives. Second, the level to which an 
integrated strategic rationality is institutionalised throughout the firm is influenced by the 
extent to which organisational beliefs and values systems are used to distribute shared 
meanings or mediate between diverse interests and interpretations of environmental 
management activities (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Cuganesan et al., 2012). Finally, informed 
by the institutionalised strategic rationality, the participation and expertise of actors across the 
organisational hierarchy determines the level to which the design and execution of the eco-
control technologies move beyond mere monitoring compliance to encompass recommending 
continuous improvements to processes. Such participative processes further act to facilitate 
knowledge integration and organisational learning at the operational level (Ditillo, 2004; 
Wouters and Wilderom, 2008) which, in turn, inform and institutionalise the evolving strategic 
rationality. 
In policy terms, to help build embedded systems, different actors (founding directors, 
domain experts, auditors and other external stakeholders) involved in a firm must help each 
other to integrate environmental and economic objectives, institutionalise strategic rationality 





This study is subject to the usual caveats of qualitative research and a number of specific 
limitations. First, while every attempt was made to gain information from a wide selection of 
individuals across the two case organisations, and to corroborate interview data with internal 
corporate documents, the evidence is based on a limited number of interview participants, and 
depends on their memory recall and personal biases. Further, the study was conducted in a 
single, environmentally sensitive industry, subject to a unique set of regulatory and stakeholder 
pressures. Future research could extend the study into other jurisdictions and industries where 
environmental management challenges and contextual contingencies may vary.  
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Table 1: Summary of Semi-structured Interview Participants 
Person Interviewed 
Years in  








Hardwood    
 Regional Manager 3 (7) 50 min X 
 Health, Safety & Environment (HSE) Coordinator 5 (7) 45 min X 
 Harvest Planning Manager 2.5 (5.5) 65 min  
 Environmental Officer (District Forester A) 2 (6) 30 min  
 District Forester B 0.5 (3) 30 min  
     
Softwood    
 General Manager, Stewardship and Risk 10 (18) 65 min X 
 Manager, Environmental Management Systems 13 (13) 40 min X 
 External Relations Manager 1.5 (10) 45 min  
 Management Accountant - Manager 5 (10) 30 min  
 Plantations Operations Manager 2 (20) 40 min  
 Stewardship Forester 7 (37) 40 min X 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of key findings  




Environmental risk management 
aimed at conformance with regulatory 
requirements and maintaining 
‘market-driven’ forest management 
certification 
“Forest Stewardship” 
Proactively manage both the risk and 
reputational aspects of interactions 
with the environment, to improve 
commercial, environmental, and 




Experts primarily identified at the 
operational level that facilitate gaining 
legitimacy through certification or 
compliance monitoring  
Limited acknowledgement or support 
for championing more voluntary 
environmental initiatives  
Experts identified at multiple levels 
ranging from the senior executive and 
to field, operational levels as well as 
community stakeholders 
Environmental experts supported by 




Negligible formal or informal systems 
that promote shared responsibility for 
environmental objectives 
Ad-hoc development processes and 
lack of transparency impedes task and 
role clarity at the operational level 
Focus on boundary rules and feedback 
systems to manage risks and maintain 
minimum standards 
Strong emphasis of formal ‘Forest 
Stewardship’ beliefs system 
Participative approach to developing 
policies and procedures fosters 
knowledge integration and employee 
commitment 
More proactive use of eco-controls to 
foster debate and discussion 




Limited conceptualisation of 
environmental performance beyond 
compliance objectives 
Improvements largely administrative 
in nature, which aid demonstration of 
compliance in future audits 
Increased knowledge about effective 
ways of managing operations 
Improved employee morale 
Enhanced relations with internal and 
external stakeholder groups 
 
 
